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Why the Auditing Standards on Evaluating
Internal Control Needed to be Replaced
Jerry D. Sullivan
Coopers & Lybrand
In February 1988, the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) of the AICPA
approved the issuance of nine Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). The
profession developed these statements to narrow what has been referred to as
the "expectations gap," the gap between what the public and financial
statement users believe auditors are responsible for and what auditors believe
they are responsible for. Among the new standards, there is one that
dramatically changes the auditor's responsibility for considering internal control
in a financial statement audit. Effective for audits of financial statements
beginning on or after January 1, 1990, SAS No. 55, Consideration of the
Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit, replaces Section
320, The Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control, of SAS No. 1.

This new standard is by far the most complex and controversial, at least
among academic circles, of the new auditing standards adopted by the
profession. This paper discusses the author's perspective on why the new
standard was issued.

Should Section 320 Have Been Revised Rather Than Replaced?
The ASB concluded that the minimum study and evaluation of internal
control required by Section 320 was insufficient for audit planning. Effective
audit planning requires the auditor to identify the types of material misstatements that could occur in the financial statements and to assess the risk that
such misstatements will occur. Because an entity's internal control significantly
affects the possibility of misstatements in the financial statements, the ASB
concluded that the auditor needed a better understanding of internal control
when planning an audit.
This is a different notion from that encompassed by the minimum study and
evaluation required by Section 320, which stated that the purpose of the review
of the system was to obtain sufficient knowledge and understanding about the
accounting system and the internal accounting control system "(a) to make a
determination of whether there are internal accounting control procedures that
may provide a basis for reliance thereon in determining the nature, extent, and
timing of substantive tests; or (b) to aid the auditor in designing substantive
tests in the absence of such reliance.'' While Section 320 required the auditor
to have a general knowledge about the control environment and flow of
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transactions through the accounting system, it did not require any knowledge
of control procedures unless the auditor planned to rely on them.
Some may argue that Section 320 (particularly the limited knowledge about
internal controls required for audit planning purposes) should have been
amended rather than completely replaced. However, the basic fabric of Section
320 was showing stress cracks, and there were compelling reasons for the
Board's conclusion that so much of it had to go, and so many new concepts and
principles had to be added, that it was far more appropriate to completely
rewrite the standard than to attempt to patch it. Section 320 had evolved on a
piecemeal basis over the past 36 years. It was a combination of three
Statements on Auditing Procedure issued between 1949 and 1972 and was later
amended by eight Statements on Auditing Standards. Several other SASs
introduced or altered auditing concepts that should have been incorporated into
Section 320, but were not.
This combination of factors created a hodge-podge of professional requirements pertaining to the study and evaluation of internal control, with the result
that many practitioners, from both small and large firms, were detouring
around the standard in conducting audits. This was evidenced by the growing
number of practitioners who preprinted memorandums for insertion into
working paper binders on all of their audits that blatantly stated, in one fashion
or another, that they "were not relying on internal controls," thereby
disavowing any responsibility to understand the client's internal control
procedures.
Such statements were too often inconsistent with the auditor's substantive
audit programs and other working papers that acknowledged the presence of
effectively operating internal controls that affected either the nature or extent
of specific substantive tests. For example, audit programs and working papers
often reflected the presence of a well planned and controlled physical inventory,
which the auditor tested for physical inventory quantities; the presence of cash
reconciliations performed by "independent" employees, which were utilized
by the auditor to restrict substantive tests of cash; and the existence of prenumbered shipping documents and customer invoices, which were matched
and accounted for by the client to ensure the completeness of revenue and
which the auditor often considered when deciding to restrict substantive tests
to analytical procedures and tests of revenue transactions in the post-balance
sheet period.
There are probably many reasons why practitioners interpreted and applied
Section 320 in the manner described above. This inconsistency in audit planning
and performance avoided "relying on controls" and incurring the cost of
applying compliance tests to specific control procedures. Compliance testing,
to most practitioners, means re-performing a specific control procedure using
the principles of sampling explained in SAS No. 39, Audit Sampling [AICPA,
1981]. This notion was exacerbated by the risk model in SAS No. 47, Audit
Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit [AICPA, 1983], which directs the
auditor's assessment of control risk to the effectiveness of internal accounting
control procedures related to an account balance or class of transactions—not to
the effectiveness of the accounting system or the control environment, which
most practitioners believe do reduce control risk in most entities. Andfinally,if
the practitioner compliance tests one or more specific control procedures,
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exactly how did he or she rely on them? How were substantive tests restricted
in either nature or extent? These problems and questions were far easier for
the practitioner to avoid by inserting a memorandum in the working papers that
avoided the whole morass.
The ASB recognized these problems associated with Section 320 and
addressed them squarely when drafting SAS No. 55. By requiring auditors to
take a different and broader view of internal controls—from the perspective of
control risks—SAS No. 55 will change dramatically the way audits are planned
and performed. The new standard will require the auditor to (a) assess control
risk associated with the control environment, which research has demonstrated
to be a principal source of audit risk; (b) broaden his or her perspective to
include not only the control environment but also the accounting system and
specific control procedures; and (c) consider control risk more discriminately,
at the assertion level rather than at the class of transactions and account
balance level, and along a continuum ranging from the maximum to the
minimum.

Importance of the Control Environment
The key elements in the ASB's response to the "expectations gap" are (i)
to increase the auditor's responsibilities in performing an audit of financial
statements, (ii) to require audits to be planned and performed to provide
reasonable assurance that materialfinancialstatement fraud and error will be
detected and, most important, (iii) to provide guidance for meeting those
increased responsibilities. To do this, the ASB needed to understand the types
of irresponsible, unreliable financial reporting that led to the concerns expressed by Congress, the press, and the organizations that sponsored the
Treadway Commission.
Research conducted at Coopers & Lybrand led to the same conclusions as
the Treadway research on fraud: the basic, underlying source of fraudulent
financial reporting is found at the very top of the organization—what the
Treadway report calls the tone at the top—not in erroneous or fictitious
transaction data used to prepare the financial statements. In other words, the
problem is not with specific internal control procedures; rather, it is related to
the attitude, awareness, and actions of management pertaining to financial
reporting—what auditors call the control environment—and this emphasizes
the need to consider the risks associated with that environment when
performing an audit.
That same research also told us that almost all the financial frauds that
occurred involved improper revenue recognition methods, the overvaluation of
assets, or incomplete information in financial statements. In each instance, the
fraudulent behavior was motivated not by a plan to embezzle corporate assets,
but rather by the desire to misleadfinancialstatement users for one or more of
a variety of reasons. Moreover, the research showed that the major frauds
were not perpetrated by manipulating data as the transactions passed through
the accounting system. In fact, the perpetrators almost always used complete,
accurate financial data in creating the misstatements.
For example, accounting estimates, such as loan loss reserves, are based
on subjective factors, and controls over them are often more difficult to
establish than controls over factual information. As a result, there is greater
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potential for bias by top management. Corporate watch-dogs, top management
and directors, are less concerned these days with the number-crunching
aspects of an audit or with the accuracy of the accounting for transactions, and
are more concerned with management's judgments, estimates, and valuation
decisions.
Thus, audit risk is not reduced by chasingfinancialtransactions endlessly
through the client's accounting systems in the mostly irrelevant, and certainly
boring, quest to establish their accuracy and the absence of "transaction
error.'' Modern computer systems have a low risk of random error (systematic
error is a greater risk, but it is generally assessed and tested by means other
than re-performing controls at the transaction level). Furthermore, in the
current computer environment, today's transactions are summarized tomorrow to assist in managing the business, which in many environments further
mitigates the risk of systematic error. In most environments, if the financial
data are corrupted, employees, management, and third parties are generally
the first to know. The auditor arrives long after the need to know arises and
corrective action is to be taken.
While the auditor still needs to assess the risk of "transaction error'' and to
take appropriate steps where it is other than low, he or she also needs to focus
on control risk from a broader perspective—the control environment. Specifically, the new standard requires the auditor to obtain the following information
about the client:
(a) Its management philosophy and operating style,
(b) Its organizational structure,
(c) Whether it has an effective audit committee,
(d) The methods it uses to communicate authority and responsibility,
(e) The management control methods it uses,
(f) Whether it has an internal audit function,
(g) Its personnel policies and procedures,
(h) External influences on its operations, and
(i) Regulatory rules under which it operates.
Many critics have suggested that the control environment is illusive and
that any assessment of it would be subjective and should not be used as a basis
to restrict substantive tests. They argue that Section 320, in its abbreviated
discussion of the control environment, stated that the auditor's understanding
of it should provide general knowledge to be considered in deciding whether to
test specific control procedures and not in restricting substantive tests.
Further, they note that specific policies and procedures in the control
environment cannot be compliance tested by re-performing them to obtain an
understanding of management's and the board's overall attitude, awareness,
and actions.
Undeniably, the auditor's assessment of the control environment involves
judgments based on his or her observation of actions and documents. However,
this does not mean that the auditor obtains the required understanding of the
control environment by casual conversations with enterprise management.
Rather, that understanding involves making judgments based on observing and
inspecting evidence of the implementation of policies and procedures that
demonstrate the actions taken by management related to thefinancialreporting
process.
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The practice aid developed by Coopers & Lybrand for understanding and
assessing the control environment requires the auditor to gather, consider, and
reach conclusions on about 60 separate factors for even the smallest clients. I
believe that the assessment of this type of information in conducting an audit
will aid in focusing the auditor's attention on risks that are unusually high, as
well as in identifying opportunities for more efficient audit procedures.

The Internal Control Structure—A Broader Concept
SAS No. 55 replaces the concept of internal control with a broader concept,
the internal control structure, which includes the control environment. The
internal control structure also includes the accounting system and specific
control procedures. This broader concept acknowledges that policies and
procedures established within each of the three elements can be relevant to
audit planning, since they are an important source of information about the
types and risk of potential misstatements in the financial statements. Each of
the three elements of the control structure also provides information about the
recording, processing, summarizing, and reporting offinancialdata useful for
designing substantive tests.
Section 320 also discussed each of the three elements, but provided limited
guidance about the control environment and the accounting system, and
excluded them from the concept of internal control. SAS No. 55, in addition to
expanding the concept of internal control, provides more guidance about the
interrelationship of these three elements of the control structure, particularly in
the context of audit planning. The new standard requires the auditor to obtain
knowledge about all three elements of the internal control structure to
determine whether policies and procedures relating to each of the elements
have been placed in operation.
The accounting system was distinguished in Section 320 from the system of
internal accounting control. This is a distinction without a difference in modern
computer systems, where thousands of programmed procedures operate
interactively to produce reliable financial data. Identifying which individual
programmed procedures operate as controls is not so important as identifying
whether the architecture of the accounting system, including the controls over
it, enables the entity to record, process, and summarize reliablefinancialdata.
SAS No. 55 requires the auditor to obtain sufficient knowledge of the
accounting system to understand:
• The classes of transactions in the entity's operations that are
significant to the financial statements;
• How those transactions are initiated;
• The accounting records, supporting documents, machine-readable
information, and specific accounts in thefinancialstatements involved
in the processing and reporting of transactions;
• The process of accounting from the initiation of a transaction to its
inclusion in the financial statements, including how the computer is
used to process data; and
• Thefinancialreporting process used to prepare the entity's financial
statements, including significant accounting estimates and disclosures.
When the auditor obtains an understanding of the accounting system and
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the control environment, he or she is also likely to obtain knowledge about
related individual control procedures. For example, when obtaining an understanding of the accounting system pertaining to inventory, the auditor usually
will become aware that physical inventory quantities are reconciled to the
accounting records. The auditor considers the knowledge about control
procedures obtained from the understanding of the control environment and
accounting system in determining the additional understanding of individual
control procedures that is necessary to plan the audit.
SAS No. 55, however, does not require the auditor to obtain an understanding of individual control procedures related to all account balances, classes of
transactions, or assertions embodied in the financial statements. The knowledge that the auditor needs about each of the internal control elements for audit
planning purposes is affected by his or her assessment of inherent risk,
preliminary judgments about materiality, the complexity of the entity's operations and systems, and information about the entity obtained from prior audits
that may be relevant to the assessment of control risk. The latter item is an
important concept that SAS No. 55 recognizes and Section 320 did not. While
this concept is new to the authoritative literature, it is already embedded in
some firms' auditing manuals and, in practice, all auditors, consciously or not,
take prior years' results into account in assessing control risk.

Assessing Control Risk Along a Broad Continuum
SAS No. 55 provides a framework for practitioners to improve their
assessment of control risk in two respects. First, it establishes a requirement
to assess control risk in relation to thefinancialstatement assertions identified
in SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter [AICPA, 1980]. This helps with the age-old
linkage problem that has confronted auditors in the past because it fuses a bond
among the internal control structure, assessing control risk, and obtaining
evidential matter about financial statement assertions.
Focusing the auditor's attention on control risk at the assertion level is
particularly important in today's audit environment. Modern computer systems
have dramatically increased the reliability of financial data on which management makes valuation judgments, and presentation and disclosure decisions.
The valuation and the presentation and disclosure assertions, which involve
management judgment applied tofinancialdata after they have been processed
by the accounting system, often represent relatively high risks to the auditor.
For example, after assessing control risk, the auditor may conclude that the
completeness, mechanical accuracy, and existence of accounts receivable are
low risks and may adjust the nature and extent of substantive tests accordingly
for these audit objectives. However, the auditor may conclude that the control
environment is not conducive to reducing control risk to a low level for the
audit objectives relating to the valuation, and the presentation and disclosure
assertions.
Section 320 and SAS No. 55 remind us that the fundamental reasons for not
permitting complete reliance on controls are the inherent limitations on the
effectiveness of accounting control, namely, human error caused by misunderstanding of instructions, mistakes of judgment, carelessness, distraction, or
fatigue; collusion; management override of controls; and the ineffectiveness of
controls in preventing wrong estimates and judgments that enter into the
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financial statements. These are all valid points about the limitations on the
effectiveness of controls. But these limitations may not be relevant to the
conclusion that there is a low level of audit risk with respect to certain
assertions regarding specific accounts, e.g., those assertions about rights and
obligations, presentation and disclosure, and the measurement of accounting
estimates.
SAS No. 55 acknowledges that when audit risk is appropriately low as a
result of the auditor's judgment about control risk together with inherent risk
for a specific assertion or related audit objective, the auditor need not apply
specific tests to an account balance or class of transactions to reduce detection
risk for that specific assertion. One of the problems with Section 320 was that it
was unclear on the issue of complete reliance on controls at the assertion level.
The auditor was told not to place complete reliance on internal control to the
exclusion of other auditing procedures with respect to particular account
balances and classes of transactions, but no guidance was given about complete
reliance at the individual assertion and audit objective levels. It is difficult to
fathom the original intent of the framers of Section 320, simply because the
notion of assertions and their relation to audit objectives was not explicitly
addressed in the literature at that time. Many auditors, and obviously the ASB,
now believe it is appropriate to permit complete reliance on controls at the
individual assertion level.
Moreover, substantive tests do not provide evidence about a single
assertion only. For example, most analytical procedures provide evidence
about all assertions relevant to an account balance. Confirmations of accounts
receivable balances, while directed primarily at obtaining evidence about the
existence assertion, also provide evidence about mechanical accuracy.
The second way in which SAS No. 55 improves the auditor's assessment of
control risk is that it replaces an "all or nothing," "rely or don't rely,"
approach with one that recognizes that the auditor's assessed level of control
risk may vary from the maximum level to the minimum level for an assertion.
The level assessed may be expressed in quantitative terms, such as percentages, or qualitative terms such as maximum, moderate, or low.
SAS No. 55 does not require the auditor to undertake procedures to assess
control risk at below the maximum level for any assertion. However, when the
auditor identifies potentially effective policies and procedures relevant to
assertions, he or she may decide that it would be efficient to test the
effectiveness of their design and operation. The tests used, which are referred
to as tests of controls in SAS No. 55, include procedures such as inquiry,
observation, inspection of documents, or reperformance of a policy or a
procedure. The auditor then assesses the evidence obtained from these tests
to make judgments about the level of control risk.
SAS No. 55 acknowledges that in many audits the minimum required
understanding of control structure policies and procedures will provide the
auditor with knowledge about their effectiveness. This will often be so whether
or not the auditor's procedures were designed to obtain evidence about the
effectiveness of control structure policies and procedures as well as to obtain
the required understanding. Thus, after obtaining the minimum understanding
required by SAS No. 55, the auditor may conclude that control risk is below the
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maximum level for some assertions because of evidence obtained about the
effectiveness of specific policies or procedures.
For example, in obtaining an understanding of the control environment, the
auditor may examine evidence of management's cash forecasting and treasury
operations. This may include inspecting management reports, as well as
tracking actual cash receipts and collection of accounts receivable and comparing them with forecasted amounts. This understanding may provide the auditor
with knowledge about management's investigation of variances and other
controls established over cash collections. In this scenario, even though the
auditor's intention was to obtain an understanding about the treasury and cash
forecasting systems used by management, the procedures may also provide
evidence about the valuation of accounts receivable.
Thus, the auditor is encouraged by SAS No. 55 to consider all evidence,
whether obtained as part of understanding the control structure or from
planned tests of controls, in reaching a judgment about the effectiveness of
control policies and procedures.

Conclusion
At a recent meeting held to consider the implications of pervasive
deficiencies noted in peer reviews conducted during the past year, eight
matters were identified that indicated the possible need for guidance in auditing
standards. Four of the eight matters related to performance deficiencies
involving Section 320, and it can be argued that a fifth one is also associated
with that section. This suggests that a disproportionately high percentage of
audit performance problems relate to the evaluation of the client's internal
control structure. While the implementation of SAS No. 55 has yet to stand the
test of peer review, the standard establishes a framework that will significantly
improve audit quality and the public perception of auditor performance.
Chairman Dingell of the Congressional Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee has often asked how auditors can examinefinancialstatements and not
know about their clients' internal controls. The answer "I didn't rely on
internal controls" doesn't play very well.
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